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NOTES
Constitutional Requirements for Standardized Ability
Tests Used in Education
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's universalist society standardized tests pose obstacles that
nearly every American must hurdle at some time. They measure an
individual's intelligence at regular intervals, determine his scholastic
achievement, allocate scholarship funds, indicate his college aptitude
and qualifications for graduate or professional study, classify him for
military service, assign him to a particular job, and indicate whether he
ultimately merits promotion.' Although standardized tests are an un-
deniably concomitant and unquestionably important part of contempo-
rary life, individuals rarely question their test scores; and the constitu-
tional implications of the use of standardized tests, especially in educa-
tion, therefore remain largely unexplored.
2
This Note examines the groundwork for possible legal remedies to
correct the abuses of tests and testing procedures used by some educa-
tors. Because the standardized ability tests administered as prerequisites
to college admission are perhaps the most significant obstacles to an
individual's educational development, the discussion herein is directed
primarily to them. This Note attempts to demonstrate that existing legal
doctrines provide an adequate basis for challenging some of the stand-
ardized ability tests used in determining college entrance requirements
as violations of equal protection and procedural due process. It also
discusses the scope of a proper remedy for individuals aggrieved by a
faulty standardized ability test.
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF STANDARDIZED ABILITY TESTS
Although human ability is a complex and diverse subject, constant
demands for selection based upon objective criteria make testing an
inevitable aspect of life.3 As long ago as 1845, Horace Mann required
I. See generally B. HOFFMANN, THE TYRANNY OF TESTING 20-21 (1962).
2. But see Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment
and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968).
3. Exact figures apparently are not available, but the number of ability tests given annually
in the United States likely exceeds its present population. D. GOSLIN, THE SEARCH FOR ABILITY
54 (1963).
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uniform written examinations for the Boston public schools to eliminate
all possibilities of favoritism, minimize the element of chance, conserve
time, and cover the subject matter tested thoroughly.4 Modern educa-
tors articulate many of the same reasons for using standardized ability
tests to help select individuals qualified for college study. They point out
that standardized ability tests provide a common reference point against
which applicants' grades, testimonials, and personal interviews can be
compared and analyzed.' Despite claims to the contrary,6 standardized
ability tests unfortunately have not achieved the heights that Mann
envisioned for them. This section examines some of the reasons for their
shortcomings.
The belief that ability is a "characteristic of an individual prior to
any interaction with the environment, and thus independent of any so-
cial or specific educational influences"7 is fundamental to the use of
standardized ability tests, and all intelligence tests are constructed on
the assumption that ability remains stable throughout life.8 Psycholo-
gists, however, are unable to agree on the exact nature and composition
of intelligence, 9 and they are uncertain whether it is innate and unchang-
ing; nevertheless, they justify the use of standardized ability tests be-
cause of their correlation with later academic success and conclude that
intelligence is simply whatever it is that their tests measure. 0
Innate ability, however, may in principle be impossible to assess.
Attempts to measure an individual's innate ability must rely in some
degree upon skills acquired after birth, the extent of which may vary
according to the quality of the environment to which the individual has
4. H. CHAUNCEY & J. DOBBIN, TESTING: ITS PLACE IN EDUCATION TODAY 11 (1963).
5. See generally B. HOFFMANN, supra note 1, at 29-35.
6. See H. CHAUNCEY & J. DOBBIN, supra note 4, at 80. See also EDUCATIONAL TESTING
SERVICE, EXPLANATION OF MULTIPLE-CHOICE TESTING (1961).
7. Ryan, IQ-The Illusion of Objectivity, in RACE AND INTELLIGENCE 41 (K. Richardson,
D. Spears & M. Richards eds. 1972).
8. Id. at 43.
9. For a discussion and analysis of the debate see Radford & Burton, Changing Intelligence,
in RACE AND INTELLIGENCE 19 (K. Richardson, D. Spears & M. Richards eds. 1972). The authors
point out that 3 general views on the nature of intelligence prevail among psychologists. The first,
inspired by Sir Francis Galton, assumes that intelligence is a "thing," stemming from hereditary
factors. A consequence of this view is that intelligence can be measured by a simple test. A second
view, inspired by J.P. Guilford, also assumes that intelligence is hereditary and can be measured;
however, it views intelligence as the product of many independent variables, each of which can be
measured. The third view, inspired by Jean Piaget, rejects the hereditary assumption underlying
the first 2 views and considers intelligence to be not unlike a living organism that interacts with its
environment. Standardized ability tests are largely based upon the first 2 views.
10. See H. CHAUNCEY & J. DOBBIN, supra note 4, at 55; B. HOFFMANN, supra note 1, at
81-82, 125-30; Ryan, supra note 7, at 38.
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been exposed." For example, schools reward such middle-class behavior
as grammatical speech and build upon skills that middle-class children
have greater opportunities to acquire. The lower income home, which
offers many distractions and little verbal orientation, breeds the learning
of inattention. Questions are not encouraged and the range of stimuli is
much narrower. There is less supervision and less meaningful social
interaction between parents and children. 12 The middle-class home, on
the other hand, offers children the opportunity to practice enunciation,
pronunciation, and grammar, and does not breed auditory inattention.
It teaches children to expect rewards for successful task completion and
consequently increases motivation. Constant interaction with their par-
ents teaches middle-class children to view them as a source of informa-
tion, correction, and perspective. Not only does the environment in
which the student is reared play an important role in test performance,
but the environment in which the student takes the examination also
influences his performance. A test administrator's behavior, age, sex,
race, and socioeconomic class all can influence test performance ad-
versely by affecting expectations of success or failure. 3 Although psy-
chologists are acutely aware of these facts and have attempted to devise
tests that minimize environmental influences," the cumulative effects of
different social histories always will be reflected in ability test scores
because "it is impossible to separate out and measure with a behavioural
test only the non-environmental determinants of ability, since these
interact with the environment in such a way as to ensure that any test
of ability will inevitably involve both aspects."15 Moreover, the idea that
individuals possess innate measurable ability is not logically consistent
with the observable fact that manipulation of variables in the testing
environment can depress standardized ability test performance.',
In defense of the theory that ability is an innate characteristic, it
should be noted that ability test scores, which are assumed to be a
measure of potential, remain relatively stable after age five.'7 Rather
than reflecting innate potential, however, score stability may be caused
1I. Ryan, supra note 7, at 42.
12. Deutsch, The Disadvantaged Child and the Learning Process, in POVERTY IN AMERICA
476-93 (L. Ferman, J. Kornbluh & A. Haber eds., rev. ed. 1968); Note, supra note 2, at 734-35.
13. See Watson, Can Racial Discrimination Affect IQ?, in RACE AND INTELLIGENCE 56-57
(K. Richardson, D. Spears & M. Richards eds. 1972).
14. See, e.g., EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, 1969-71 ANNUAL REPORT, NEW NEEDS,
NEw RESPONSES 26-29 (1972).
15. Ryan, supra note 7, at 43.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 44.
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by any of three different factors.1 8 First, an unchanging test score may
not reflect innate ability, but only the consistent and pervasive influence
of environmental factors. Secondly, standardized ability tests may gen-
erate their own self-fulfilling prophecy, because a score obtained at one
age often determines the quality of an individual's subsequent educa-
tion. Saddled with the label of a "slow learner," an individual often
receives an education designed for the slow student. Consequently, his
ability test scores may reflect only his inadequate education. Thirdly,
because standardized ability tests assume that ability is stable and un-
changing, psychologists design their tests to yield unchanging scores by
omitting questions that do not receive similar responses from individu-
als of supposedly equal ability.
Despite the fact that standardized ability tests may not, and possi-
bly cannot, precisely measure innate characteristics such as intelligence,
educability, or ability, there is a positive relationship between test scores
and future educational success. That relationship, however, may be indi-
cative only of a selection process that underassesses the ability of some
qualified individuals. The inability of some standardized ability tests to
assess an individual's talents accurately is, of course, the crux of the
problem that any legal challenge must address, and the question to be
answered is whether the utility derived from using an imprecise predic-
tion of ability outweighs an inaccurately measured individual's interest
in a further education.
Underassessment can result from either of two factors-faults in-
herent in the composition of the test itself, or the use of insensitive
validation procedures-neither of which is related to ability. Faults
inherent in the test can result either from ambiguous or poorly worded
questions or from leaving some determinants of ability untested. Am-
biguous questions can punish good students and reward superficial
ones.'9 When a test question contains an obviously correct answer and
another partially correct answer, for example, only the average student
immediately chooses the obviously correct answer. The superior stu-
dent, however, pauses, thereby sacrificing precious time, not only on the
ambiguous questions, but on the entire test, because he thereafter reads
each question warily. The resulting score therefore may not indicate
which student is more capable; rather, it may indicate which is more
superficial. Indeed, if the answer sought is only partially correct and
another answer is also partially correct, the superior student may an-
18. For a more complete discussion of these factors see Ryan, supra note 7, at 40-46.
19. See B. HOFFMANN, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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swer the question incorrectly, thinking he has supplied a perceptive
answer to a subtle, thought-provoking question.2 1 Psychologists them-
selves also admit that standardized ability tests cannot measure creativ-
ity or motivation, 2' and that poorly worded questions may penalize
depth, subtlety, and acumen.
Underassessment also may result from the use of insensitive valida-
tion procedures. Once a test has been constructed, it is validated by
trying it out on a large, representative sample of the population. Test
makers validate their tests to prove that each test actually measures
what it purports to measure.22 Scores achieved by the population sample
are correlated with some other criterion of the ability that the test seeks
to measure. Unless this "outside" criterion is external to and indepen-
dent of the times within the test, the validation procedure becomes
circular, and the test maker validates the test against itself.23 Psycholo-
gists typically validate standardized ability tests by comparing test
scores with later college success; new questions are tested by inserting
them into an existing test.24 Using college grades as an ultimate standard
of predictability, however, reinjects precisely those subjective elements
of selection that the designers of standardized tests seek to avoid.
25
Moreover, validating new test questions by performance on another
20. Professor Hoffmann supplies an example of such a question that he found in a booklet
called Science, prepared by the College Entrance Examination Board to describe science tests used
by the Board as part of its college entrance testing program, and described as being of average
difficulty:
54. The burning of gasoline in an automobile cylinder involves all of the following except
(A) reduction
(B) decomposition
(C) an exothermic reaction
(D) oxidation
(E) conversion of matter to energy.
The average chemistry student chooses (E), the wanted answer, believing that the conversion of
matter to energy involves nuclear reactions and thus is inappropriate to the burning of gasoline.
The superior student, says Professor Hoffmann, understands the formula E=mc and knows that
in certain nuclear reactions energy is released when nuclear bonds that compose part of the rest
mass of the substance involved in the reaction are broken. The superior student, therefore, faces
the prospect of choosing an answer to a question with 5 "correct" answers. See B. HOFFMANN,
supra note 1, at 185-88.
21. See H. CHAUN cEY & J. DOBBIN, supra note 4, at 19. See also Ryan, supra note 7, at
47-49, who argues that test questions often are selected upon the criterion of whether they show
statistically significant differences between persons of equal age. Ryan argues that the statistical
significance of some questions therefore may reflect trivial aspects of behavior rather than ability.
22. See H. CHAUNCEY & J. DOBBIN, supra note 4, at 9, 55.
23. Ryan, supra note 7, at 39.
24. See B. HOFFMANN, supra note 1, at 130.
25. Id.
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standardized test may have a deleterious effect upon students taking the
test and, in addition, may perpetuate existing deficiences in the older
test, which the test maker perhaps validated against the subjectively
measured criterion of later college performance.2" Furthermore, validat-
ing a test by correlating it with college success implicitly introduces
social and environmental influences into the selection process."
Despite the efforts of psychologists, there is also evidence that the
population samples used in constructing standardized ability tests intro-
duce inherent cultural bias into test scores. The population samples
ordinarily used conform to the proportion in the most recent census of
certain variables-including urban or rural residence, socioeconomic
status, and parental education. 28 Census data, however, exclude some
migrant and unemployed workers, "who tend to be lost from a census,"
and at least some standardized ability tests are standardized against an
all-white sample.29 The occasional exclusion of migrants, the unem-
ployed, and blacks can have at least two important consequences. First,
the standardization sample will overreflect the influence of individuals
of superior economic status. Because test scores may not actually mea-
sure intelligence but rather may indicate only an individual's perform-
ance in relation to a large group," the scores of individuals from low-
income groups may not manifest the same distribution as the scores of
the higher income sample; and in the comparison that produces a test
score, the low-income individual may fare poorly."1 A second, obvious
consequence results from excluding blacks from standardization sam-
ples: the standardized test measures only white abilities. It cannot mea-
sure the intelligence of blacks and only provides a measure of how well
blacks score on tests of white intelligence,3 2 if indeed any test can
measure intelligence per se. Because blacks have cultural patterns that
are substantially different from those of whites, and are more likely to
have a lower socioeconomic status than whites,33 the lower test scores
that blacks customarily achieve on standardized ability tests may be
only a measure of their cultural and economic differences from
whites.34
26. Id.
27. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 41.
28. Id. at 52-53.
29. Id.
30. See H. CHAUNCEY & J. DOBBIN, supra note 4, at 6.
31. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 53.
32. Id.
33. See text accompanying notes 13-14, supra.
34. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 734-35. Of course it can be argued that if standard.
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The ability of standardized ability tests to measure what such tests
purport to measure is expressed as a coefficient of correlation. A coeffi-
cient of correlation is a measure of relevance by which psychologists
express less than complete correspondence between two variables.35
Correlations range from +1 to -1. Zero indicates a complete lack of
relationship, and both +1 and -1 correspond to perfect relationships,
from which the rank of one individual on one test would predict exactly
his performance on a second. Perfect relationships rarely occur, but less
than perfect relationships are common. Thus, there is a positive correla-
tion between increased height and increased weight; that is, the taller a
person is, the heavier he is likely to be. Similarly, as the number of polio
vaccinations increases, the number of subsequent polio cases decreases.
Interpreting coefficients of correlation is a risky endeavor. A high coef-
ficient does not not indicate a causal relationship between the two varia-
bles, but only the strength of their relationship. Moreover, a coefficient
of .5, although better than a relationship of .25 and genuinely signifi-
cant, is not twice as significant as a coefficient of .25 or half as signifi-
cant as 1.0. Some standardized ability tests used in college admission
procedures have a coefficient of correlation with freshman grades of
approximately .50.36 A correlation of .50, however, represents only a
thirteen percent improvement over a zero correlation, and is not quite
as high as the coefficient for the obviously imperfect height and weight
proposition described above.3 7 Psychologists themselves caution the
public not to assume haphazardly that a standardized ability test pre-
dicts with certain accuracy, but some schools and educators heedlessly
use such scores as an absolutely infallible measure of ability. 8
In addition, many people misunderstand the meaning of the scores
derived from standardized ability test performance. Ability test scores
are not absolute measures of an individual's innate ability; rather, they
are comparisons of the individual's performance with that of other per-
sons taking the test or to another group that previously took the test.39
ized ability tests reflect only "the hard facts of social circumstances," it is society itself and not
the test that is being unfair. J. CONANT, SLUMS AND SUBURBS 21 (1964), cited in Note, supra note
2, at 735 n.231. As the author of the above note points out, however, a test score gives society a
number sufficient to justify its inequitable treatment of culturally deprived individuals.
35. See generally H. KENDLER, BASIC PSYCHOLOGY 69-73 (1963).
36. B. HOFFMANN, supra note 1, at 138.
37. Id. at 139-40.
38. See Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1972); EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, supra note 14, at 30-32. The ETS has considered with-
drawing services from test users who misuse test scores in this manner. Id. at 32.
39. See H. CHAUNCEY & J. DOBBIN, supra note 4, at 3.
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Scores, therefore, do not convey anything about the magnitude of the
differences in ability that separate individuals with different test scores.
Scores merely reveal that one individual has done better or worse than
another on one particular test." Viewed in this manner, test scores are
merely indications of an individual's progress on a scale of difficulty
against which people of similar age and educational background are
measured. Progression on a scale of difficulty, however, is not an idea
that educators, attempting to utilize standardized ability tests to mea-
sure innate ability at a specific point in time, would acknowledge read-
ily; this focus upon static, absolute measurement is, in effect, a refusal
to recognize that an individual can be a slow or late developer and also
an intelligent person.41 Treated as some one of low intelligence, a late
developer may never receive the education that he deserves.
One other fact concerning the meaning of standardized ability test
scores deserves mention. Such tests do not attempt to measure the
overall concept of ability; rather, they attempt to measure the various
components of it. The test maker totals scores on the components of
the test to produce a composite score. Although their total scores may
be equal, individuals' scores on the different components sometimes
vary considerably. 2 Consequently, individuals highly qualified for one
particular kind of study may achieve low overall ability scores, and
some individuals obtaining relatively high scores may not be highly
qualified for any particular kind of study.4"
To summarize the preceding discussion, standardized ability tests
have three fundamental deficiencies. First, they may not measure ability
at all. Secondly, although they do have an undeniable relationship to
40. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 49-50.
41. Id. Indiscriminate use of test scores has led to the extended use of the terms "under-
achiever" and "overachiever." If a student performs well on an intelligence test but does poorly in
school, he is labelled an underachiever. Similarly, if he scores poorly on such a test but does well
in school, he is labelled an overachiever. Teachers' estimates of the child's intelligence are disre-
garded, and the test scores themselves become the ultimate measures of intelligence. The adverse
psychological effect of being saddled with the misnomer underachiever or overachiever is immeas-
urable. Depending upon a college's admissions standards, either label also might damage one's
chance for admission. For a discussion of this problem see B. HOFFMANN, supra note 1, at 140-
41.
42. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 51.
43. Some tests avoid this problem by producing a profile for each individual for the several
components of the test. See id. For other explanations of standardized testing techniques see A.
ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (3d ed. 1968); H. BUTCHER, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE: ITS
NATURE AND ASSESSMENT (1968); L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (1949);
D. LAVIN, THE PREDICTION OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE (1965). For other criticisms of standard-
ized testing see L. BARITZ, THE SERVANTS OF POWER (1960); M. GROSS, THE BRAIN WATCHERS
(1962); W. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
[Vol. 26
1973] STANDARDIZED ABILITY TESTS IN EDUCATION 797
future college performance, that relationship is more imprecise than
many believe, and a test score may not reveal the true nature of an
individual's readiness for college work. Thirdly, employers and educa-
tors sometimes use standardized ability test scores as measures of an
individual's overall ability at one point in time. In fact, however, ability
tests attempt to measure only components of ability and do not account
for the possibility that ability might change or that one component of
ability might be sufficient to qualify an individual for college study. The
remainder of this Note addresses itself to these deficiencies and attempts
to use the doctrines of equal protection and due process, the traditional
means for protecting an individual's rights from the abuses of govern-
mental powers, to describe an adequate legal remedy.
III. STATE ACTION
A preliminary limitation on invoking the equal protection or due
process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment is the requirement of
state action." To trigger those guarantees, an individual must show that
a state has acted in a constitutonally cognizable manner. The rationale
of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 5 which involved a restaur-
ant that leased space within a state-owned parking garage and refused
to serve blacks, seemingly provides an umbrella of state action sufficient
to invoke the guarantees of equal protection and due process against a
public college or university that requires the submission of standardized
ability test scores as a prerequisite to admission. In Burton, the Su-
preme Court explained that the state had built the garage with public
funds and subsequently had owned and operated it as a parking garage.
To service the debts incurred while constructing it, the state leased
portions of the building to private individuals. Upkeep, maintenance,
and repairs for the building, including the restaurant, were the re-
sponsibility of the state. Regardless of improvements to the building, the
restaurant received the benefits of the garage's tax exemption. The
Court speculated that customers of both the restaurant and the garage
probably utilized other facilities in the building, thus conferring inciden-
tal benefits on both the state and the restaurant. Concluding that the
44. See generally Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of
Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952); Black,
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L.
REV. 1083 (1960); St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action,
Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Van Alstyne
& Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961).
45. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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state had "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with
the restaurant, the Court found that the case presented a degree of state
participation and involvement in a discriminatory action sufficient to
fulfill the requirements of state action.
4
After the Burton decision,47 would-be plaintiffs might have con-
cluded that the requirements of state action are satisfied whenever the
state by inaction permits discrimination by private persons with whom
it has an official connection. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,"8 which held
that Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme for issuing liquor licenses to
private clubs did not implicate the state sufficiently in the actions of a
private club that refused to serve blacks, has discredited that view thor-
oughly. Moose Lodge does not, however, impair the underlying princi-
ple of Burton-that state participation or involvement in discrimination
to a significant extent is sufficient to trigger the equal protection or due
process guaiantees. When a public college or university requires stand-
ardized ability test scores as a prerequisite to admission, the argument
for finding state participation and involvement is fairly persuasive. Test
makers would find it difficult to exist without the support of public
institutions that require students to utilize their services, and the state
institution relies on the test maker for an important component of its
admissions decisions. In all likelihood, students take the test in a public
building, and public officials, their teachers, often administer the tests.
The institution and the test maker exist in a symbiotic relationship of
the type condemned in Burton; consequently, the equal protection and
due process limitations should apply to the test maker insofar as they
applied to the restaurant in Burton.
46. Id. at 725.
47. See also Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964) (hotel
built upon land purchased by Tennessee as a part of a redevelopment project); Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (massive use of federal funds received after
state enacted enabling legislation); Lee v. Macon County Board of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D.
Ala. 1968) (state high school athletic association whose officials acted as state agents, located in
state office building, and paying no rent, with representative on state advisory board). But see
Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969) (tax exemption given private university insuffi-
cient without a showing that the exemption could be used to dictate or influence school affairs);
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) (incorporation of liberal arts college and state regulation
of education insufficient absent showing that state action actually inflicted plaintiff's injury); Eaton
v. Board of Managers, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959) (hospital
receiving less than 4 1/2% of its budget from state funds); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ.,
287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (state action must be in the actual discriminatory act attacked,
although 50% of university's expenses are paid by public funds); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F.
Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), remanded, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (university found to be a
strictly private enterprise). See also Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 44, at 57.
48. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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As a practical matter, the application of a legal remedy to the use
of standardized tests in public institutions probably would carry over to
private institutions as well. In addition to state participation, however,
the scope of the state action doctrine is perhaps broad enough to apply
directly to the testing agency itself, which arguably fulfills a public
function. For example, in Marsh v. Alabama,49 a Jehovah's Witness
distributing religious literature on a sidewalk in Chickasaw, Alabama,
was told to leave because rules of the company that owned the town
prohibited solicitation without permission. When she refused to leave,
a deputy sheriff employed by the company as the town's policeman
arrested her for trespassing. Characterizing the operation of the town
as a public function, the Supreme Court reversed her state court convic-
tion and held that the company's property rights were insufficient to
justify a restriction of appellant's first and fourteenth amendment
rights.
Justice Black's majority opinion in Marsh did not make it alto-
gether clear whether the finding of state action rested on the peculiar
nature of Chickasaw itself, the fact that the company town fulfilled a
public function, 0 Alabama's enforcement of the city's exclusion,51 or a
combination of the three factors. The subsequent decision of
Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. ,52
which held that a privately owned shopping center could not obtain an
injunction prohibiting peaceful picketing against one of its tenants on
its parking lot and sidewalk, did not clarify the situation; nor did the
decision of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,53 which held that a privately owned
shopping center could prohibit handbilling in its interior mall. In Lloyd,
the Supreme Court distinguished Marsh by saying that it involved the
anomalous "assumption by a private enterprise of all the attributes of
a state-created municipality" 54 and distinguished Logan Valley by say-
ing that the Logan Valley case involved first amendment activity related
49. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
50. See St. Antoine, supra note 44, at 1001. See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)
(park maintained by private trustees after city resigned as trustee in order to enforce racial restric-
tion on the park's use); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (voluntary "club" of white Demo-
crats' holding pre-primary elections); Public Util. Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (public
transit system).
51. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953).
52. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
53. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
54. Id. at 569. See also Central Hardware v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
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to the shopping center's operations that defendants otherwise could not
reasonably have conveyed to the public.5
A common rationale for the three decisions may be drawn from the
fact that the company in Marsh supplied all the basic governmental
functions, including streets and sidewalks, depriving the Jehovah's Wit-
ness of an adequate public forum for expressing her views. In Logan
Valley, the picketers were similarly without an adequate forum again
because public sidewalks were not nearby and because the picketers'
target was within the center. In Lloyd, on the other hand, the city had
fulfilled the function of providing sidewalks nearby, and the handbillers
had no specific target within the center. In the two cases finding state
action, Marsh and Logan Valley, a private body had undertaken to
supply an otherwise unavailable government service. In Lloyd, on the
other hand, the government already had supplied a public forum in the
form of public facilities for expression.
On the basis of the three decisions, a finding of state action appar-
ently hinges on whether a private body undertakes to supply a govern-
mental service that is otherwise unavailable. State and local govern-
ments typically provide a good or service under any of four circumstan-
ces.5" First, joint consumption of the good or service may be possible,
so that consumption by one consumer does not diminish the amount
available for others. The costs of excluding potential consumers and
limiting consumption are infinite. The government, therefore, supplies
the good or service and charges each taxpayer for its consumption. An
example is mosquito abatement. Secondly, there may be externalities in
consumption, so that the benefits or costs of an activity may accrue to
or be imposed upon someone other than the consumer. In order to
internalize the costs of an activity having externalities, the government
undertakes regulation, as in the case of pollution control. Similarly, the
government may undertake to supply a good or service because some
of its benefits accrue to persons other than the recipient-for example,
public education. Thirdly, governments sometimes supply goods or serv-
ices although neither joint consumption nor externalities are involved.
This is likely when the costs of identifying specific consumers would
exceed the revenues derived from charging a direct price for the good
or service. An example is a public park. Fourthly, some individuals may
derive a benefit or pleasure from knowing that other individuals are able
to consume more of the good or service than they would be able to if
55. 407 U.S. at 566-70.
56. See W. HIRSCH, THE ECONOMICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1-28 (1970).
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the marketplace alone determined its distribution. In order to derive
those benefits, such individuals are willing to pay higher taxes and per-
mit the government to supply the good or service. Welfare benefits are
an example, but education also falls within this category as well as
within the second one.
Standardized ability testing presents aspects of both the second and
fourth reasons. As in the case of public education, the community as a
whole benefits from having each individual who would benefit thereby
attend college. Presumably, it therefore could establish a testing proce-
dure designed to find those persons who would profit from a college
education. Moreover, some individuals would pay higher taxes in order
to attain the benefits of a well-educated populace. In either case, eco-
nomic theory would support the establishment of government testing
programs. When a public institution instead relies on private agencies
either to screen applicants or to develop admissions criteria, the force
of the Marsh and Logan Valley decisions seemingly would trigger the
guarantees of equal protection and due process against the testing
agency regardless of whether it eventually provided a public or private
institution with the scores.1
7
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Although the equal protection clause58 recognizes that state laws
57. Several recent lower federal court decisions have held that private utilities have acted
under color of state law according to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), by terminating the utility services
of customers without notice. See Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See also
Haydock, State Action: Public Utilities and the Public Interest, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 69 (1972).
In lhrke, the court concluded that the utility fulfilled a public function because the local govern-
ment, in effect, had given the utility a monopoly, and as a practical matter the utility's services
were not available elsewhere. 459 F.2d at 570. Although a testing agency is not as entwined with
state university control as a public utility is with local government control, the effect is the
same-governmental action forces the individual to seek a service from the private sector that is
otherwise unavailable. See also Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Col-
leges & Secondary Schools, 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). In Marjorie Webster, the district court found that a college accredit-
ing association fulfilled a public function because accreditation was necessary for a college to
continue successful operations and to obtain federal aid-to-education funds, and because the asso-
ciation was recognized by the federal government as a reliable authority on the quality of training
offered by educational institutions. 302 F. Supp. at 470. The court of appeals reversed on other
grounds, but assumed arguendo that state action was present. 432 F.2d at 658-59. Just as accredita-
tion is necessary to operate a college successfully, standardized test scores are prerequisites for
college admission. Moreover, the states recognize testing agencies as reliable authorities on scho-
lastic ability.
58. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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may treat citizens differently for various purposes by classification,
"persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law" must be accorded equal treatment. 9 Equal protection analysis,
therefore, deals with two fundamental questions6 -whether the state
has acted with an unconstitutional purpose and whether the state has
classified together all and only those persons who are similarly situated.
Depending upon the criteria that the state uses to draw the lines creating
the classifications, the nature of the rights asserted by the persons classi-
fied, and the means used to create the classifications, the Supreme Court
has supplied varying answers to the two questions. This section applies
standards recently articulated by the Court to the imprecise classifica-
tions drawn by standardized ability tests.
Like state laws, standardized ability tests classify individuals into
various groups. When a standardized ability test determines that one's
ability is insufficient to satisfy a college's admissions criteria,"' two
theoretical classes of individuals are created: those qualified and those
not qualified. The classes in fact may be mutually exclusive, the quali-
fied class containing only qualified persons and the unqualified class
containing only the unqualified; however, as section II of this Note
demonstrates, it is more probable that each class is both under- and
59. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 346
(1949); cf. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
60. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (1969).
61. Of course, many factors in addition to an ability test score figure in a college admissions
decision. The following factors, which various institutions rank differently in order of importance,
are the most common criteria: (1) high school grades; (2) rank in class; (3) ability test scores from
the senior year; (4) ability test scores from the junior year; (5) achievement test scores; (6) National
Merit Scholarship Examination (a competitive scholarship exam) scores; (7) various other test
scores; (8) extracurricular activity; (9) principal's recommendation; (10) other recommendations;
(11) personal interview; (12) family or personal pressures. B. FINE, How TO BE ACCEPTED BY THE
COLLEGE OF YOUR CHOICE, Appendix (rev. ed. 1966), cited in O'Neil, Preferential Admissions:
Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 702 n.8 (1971).
Admitting or denying an applicant admission is a discretionary act, and few if any institutions
likely employ test scores as the sole admissions criteria. The discretionary nature of admissions
does not mean, however, that any criteria whatsoever may be employed in exercising discretion.
A claim that the choice of criteria on which admissions decisions were made was not attributable
solely to chance and, therefore, must have rested on some sort of discriminatory motivation should
be sufficient to trigger judicial review. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1254-69 (1970). Moreover, some universities apparently
have minimum score requirements. See, e.g., Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School
Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 1972) (Rives, C.J. dissenting) (minimum cutoff score on ability
test used to measure capacity for graduate study in education). Presumably, one's test scores could
be so low as to preclude entrance because of their impact in the above admissions "formula."
Indeed, those most likely to be aggrieved by a standardized ability test are those whose "true"
ability lies near the point at which the above factors taken together would fulfill a college's
admissions criteria, so that any inaccuracy in the test score could have adverse impact.
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over-inclusive, containing persons who should not be included and not
containing all those persons who should be included.
A. The Standard of Review for Test-Created Classifications
Despite the occasional imprecision of state-created classifications,
the courts traditionally have not reviewed these classifications actively;
and a strong presumption of constitutionality applies if the method of
classification is rationally related to a valid public purpose. 2 Until re-
cently, the application of this restrained standard of review always has
been tantamount to a finding that a method of classification is constitu-
tional. Two elements of the restrained standard have contributed to the
occasionally frustrating results produced by its application-the Su-
preme Court's steadfast refusal to impute an impermissible motive to
the purpose of a state-created classification and its imaginativeness
when determining whether a method of classification bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate public purpose. Because it is virtually impos-
sible for a court, which must act upon the record before it, to ascertain
the motive or collection of motives underlying a state-created classifica-
tion, and because classifications created for an impermissible motive
pursuant to a legitimate state objective presumably would be constitu-
tional if adopted for a valid motive, the Court's unwillingness to attrib-
ute an impermissible motive to state-created classifications is a sound
principle possessing small likelihood of repudiation.6 3 In addition, the
Court always has afforded ample latitude when the states attempt to
regulate a perceived evil by economic or resource-allocation legisla-
tion.64 Because the rationality of a classification created by economic
regulation or resource-allocation legislation often depends on "local
conditions," a local legislative or administrative body is probably better
informed about them than a court. 5 Moreover, legislatures and admin-
istrative bodies may possess greater expertise and have access to
62. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute denying bartending licenses
to all women except wives or daughters of male bar owners conceivably for the permissible purpose
of avoiding social and moral problems rather than the impermissible one of monopolizing jobs for
men); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (nepotism in selection of
river pilots conceivably related to promoting the public safety). See also Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 1077-87.
63. The most recent application of the principle was in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
224-25 (1971) (refusal to impute racial motivation to the closing of a city's municipal swimming
pools following judicially ordered desegregation).
64. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). But see Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957).
65. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 514-15 (1937).
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information-gathering procedures that are unavailable to the courts."
As a result, the Court requires only a slight degree of rationality be-
tween classifications created by economic or social welfare legislation
and a legitimate public purpose. The Court therefore will uphold the
classification whenever it can conceive of a "reasonable basis" for sus-
taining it.67
When basic personal interests of individuals are involved, however,
the local conditions argument fails because the Court's expertise then
equals or exceeds that of a legislature or administrative body and exces-
sive deference or restraint is unwarranted. This is, of course, the argu-
ment that underlies the use of the compelling interest test, which the
Court perhaps adopted because the traditional standard of review nei-
ther adequately protected certain basic freedoms nor fully safeguarded
the interests of the politically disadvantaged." The compelling interest
standard requires the state to establish not only that it has a compelling
interest justifying the classification, but also that the classification is
necessary to achieve the state's purpose. The effect of the stricter stan-
dard is to reverse the traditional presumption of constitutionality and
place a virtually insurmountable burden of proof on the party seeking
to sustain the classification. The standard has two branches-the "sus-
pect criteria" branch and the "fundamental interest" branch. A finding
that a state-created classification turns on a suspect criterion or burdens
a fundamental interest triggers application of the compelling interest
standard. The identification of a suspect class or a fundamental interest,
however, has been tantamount to a declaration of unconstitutionality, 9
and the determination of whether someone needs the special protection
of the compelling interest standard thus involves complex policy evalua-
tions. The Court, therefore, has been noticeably reluctant to expand the
range of fundamental interests and suspect classifications."
66. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 1128.
67. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). See also cases cited note 62 supra.
68. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 1128-29.
69. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
70. The following cases have identified fundamental interests: Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972) (right to move interstate freely); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969), and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (procedural rights of
criminal defendants); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to
procreate). Other cases identify possible fundamental interests: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (right to marry); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)
(right to an education). San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973),
held that education is not a fundamental interest to which the compelling interest standard applies.
The decision probably has halted a growing trend of decisions finding unconstitutional local prop-
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Faced with two standards of equal protection review whose even-
tual effects are mechanically either to uphold or to invalidate state-
created classifications, the Supreme Court has begun to articulate a
third standard of equal protection review lying between the traditional
and compelling interest standards.71 Although it verbally applies the
traditional rational relationship standard, the Court's new approach is
basically different; rather than requiring only the ability to conceive a
rational basis for the classification, the Court focuses its analysis on the
actual means chosen to effect the legislative purpose. The cases articu-
lating the new approach represent a substantial departure from the
compelling interest standard, which hinges exclusively on the ultimate
effect of a classification. The emphasis now is upon whether state-
erty tax systems used to support public schools. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870
(D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971);
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). In addition to finding that education
is not a fundamental interest, the majority concluded that the state system did not create an
impermissible wealth classification. Subsequently, the Court found the system constitutional by
applying the traditional, lenient standard of review reserved for economic or resource allocation
legislation. Justices White and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions. Justice White, perhaps applying
an intermediate standard of review, concluded that the state system lacked a rational basis of
classification. See 93 S. Ct. 1312, 1346 n.96. Justice Marshall argued that the state had not
sufficiently justified its school finance system, that the concept of equal protection includes more
than 2 standards of review, that education is a fundamental interest, that the system impermissibly
discriminated on the basis of wealth, and that the state had chosen an inappropriate means to
further its asserted interest. See 93 S. Ct. 1315. If the case had not involved property taxation, a
decision that often hinges upon local conditions, the Court might have applied a different standard
of review. See also Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitu-
tional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969); Horowitz & Neitring,
Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs
From Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 787 (1968).
The following cases have identified suspect classifications: Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ancestry). The Supreme Court consistently has declined to hold that
poverty is a suspect classification. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). In the
absence of de jure classification, the Supreme Court has assumed the existence of an impermissible
purpose to create a suspect classification only when legislative or administrative action falls with
disproportionate impact upon the members of different classes and other objective criteria point
to the existence of an impermissible purpose. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
(redistricting of Tuskegee, Alabama, from a square into a 28-sided figure, thereby excluding
virtually all the city's black voters but not one white voter); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (discriminating against black inhabitants in providing municipal services).
Although standardized ability test scores have disproportionate impact on the races, demonstrating
an impermissible purpose by objective criteria is virtually impossible. See also cases discussed in
note 94 infra.
71. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
The following discussion in large measure parallels Professor Gunther's analysis. But see United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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created classifications bear a substantial relationship to an asserted
rather than a conjectural legislative purpose. This standard affords the
state wider latitude to classify than does the compelling interest stan-
dard, and the classification is measured by its purpose rather than the
value judgments of the Court on whether a class is suspect or an interest
fundamental. Although the model arguably applies to economic and
social welfare legislation as well as to other types, considerations of
judicial competence would presumably limit its application to instances
in which judicially manageable inquiries are possible. Similarly, the
standard also would apply in situations that previously triggered appli-
cation of the compelling interest standard, but then the importance of
the interests involved still would justify strict scrutiny of the state-
created classifications.
Two recent cases formulating the new doctrine are Reed v. Reed
2
and Eisenstadt v. Baird.73 In Reed, the Idaho probate code provided
that, in situations in which both male and female members of the same
entitlement class had filed letters of administration, males were entitled
to preference over females, without regard to individual qualifications
as potential estate administrators. Quoting from an earlier case,74 the
Supreme Court invalidated the statute under the equal protection
clause, holding: "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' -71 The state courts had
justified the absolute preference for males by reasoning that the legisla-
ture had sought to reduce the workload of the probate courts by elimi-
nating one class of contestants for the letters of administration. 7 Exam-
ining that justification, the Court found it an unconstitutional "arbitrary
72. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
73. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See also James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); cf. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346, 364 (1970) ("Without excluding the possibility that other circumstances might present them-
selves in which a property qualification for office-holding could survive constitutional scrutiny, we
cannot say, on the record before us, that the present freeholder requirement for membership on
the county board of education amounts to anything more than invidious discrimination."). Gunther
theorizes that the new standard of equal protection stems from 3 factors: the reluctance of the
Burger Court to expand the scope of the compelling interest standard; its discontent with the
previous 2-tiered formulation of equal protection; and a desire to intervene in situations without
resorting to the strict scrutiny of the compelling interest standard. Gunther, supra note 71, at 12-
20..
74. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
75. 404 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added).
76. See Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970).
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legislative choice" forbidden by the equal protection clause.77 The Court
did not indulge in speculation by trying to conceive a rational basis for
the legislation; it limited its examination solely to the justifications
offered by the state.
The Court adopted a similar analytic approach in Eisenstadt, which
concerned the validity of a state statute prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives by anyone except pharmacists filling physicians' pre-
scriptions for married persons. The state justified the dissimilar treat-
ment for married and unmarried persons on three bases: first, as a
deterrent to fornication; second, as a health measure; and third, as a
prohibition on contraception. The Court again did not indulge in specu-
lation; instead, it analyzed the statutory classifications in terms of over-
and underinclusion. If the state intended the statute as a deterrent to
fornication, the Court reasoned that including married and excluding
unmarried persons was irrational because the classes were "riddled with
exceptions." ' The Court cited as examples the facts that the statute did
not reach illicit relations between married and unmarried persons and
that it prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to prevent pregnancy
but not disease. Secondly, the Court refused to believe that the state had
enacted the statute as a health measure. Central to that determination
was the legislature's inclusion of the statutory section in a chapter of
the state code entitled "Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency
and Good Order. ' 79 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that if the statute
was enacted as a health measure, it would "invidiously discriminate"
against unmarried persons by denying them statutory protection and
would be overbroad with respect to married persons because not all
contraceptives are potentially dangerous.8 " Finally, the Court concluded
that if the statute was enacted to prohibit contraception, then granting
contraceptives to married persons and denying them to unmarried per-
sons would be underinclusive and thus work an invidious discrimination
77. 404 U.S. at 76.
78. 405 U.S. at 449. Essentially, the Court concluded that the classes with respect to
deterring fornication were both under- and over-inclusive. By failing to reach relations between
married and unmarried persons, the statute was under-inclusive as far as unmarried persons are
concerned and over-inclusive as far as married persons are concerned. By prohibiting the distribu-
tion only of contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, the statute was clearly under-inclusive with
respect to preventing fornication.
79. 405 U.S. at 450. The Court also pointed out that health needs could not possibly vary
according to whether the contraceptive was used to prevent pregnancy or prevent disease. 405 U.S.
at 451 n.8. Moreover, the Court noted that federal health laws already regulated the distribution
of potentially harmful products. 405 U.S. at 452.
80. 405 U.S. at 451 n.8 (referring to methods used by Casanova).
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because the two classes were similarly situated with respect to the per-
ceived "evil." 81
Reed and Eisenstadt together may portend the advent of a new
constitutional approach with respect to personal interests. When state
economic or resource-allocation legislation has been involved, the
Court's approach has been to invoke a strong presumption in favor of
constitutionality. On the other hand, when state-created classifications
have hinged upon suspect criteria or burdened a fundamental interest,
the Court essentially has invoked a strong presumption against the
classifications. The effect of the new approach may be that when legisla-
tion affecting some asserted personal interest is challenged on the basis
of equal protection, the Court will not create a presumption either for
or against the legislation; instead it will require the party seeking to
uphold the classification to carry the burden of proof and demonstrate
that a fair and substantial relationship exists between the classifications
and a legitimate state purpose.82 What the Court determines to be a fair
and substantial degree of relationship, however, may vary according to
the importance of the personal interest affected,83 and to this extent the
ultimate effect of the classification rather than the means used to effect
it still will be relevant. In Eisenstadt, the affected interests were akin to
the marital right of privacy protected in Griswold v. Connecticut" and
81. 405 U.S. at 454. Although Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion of the Court, did
not express the views of a majority of the Court, support for the new approach has come from all
segments of the Court. See Gunther, supra note 71, at 19 & n.91.
82. Of course, whatever the Court perceives to be the purpose that the state is pursuing will
have a great effect on whether it is rational. Indeed, often the purpose simply is inferred by
reference to the classification. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 60, at
1082. Consequently, if the statute creates classes "riddled with exceptions," the courts may be
hesitant to concur in a state's assertion of purpose. See. e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). See also Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123
(1972).
83. Cf. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 1120-21: "The inter-
action of these two factors [suspect criteria and fundamental interests] can be visualized by imagin-
ing two gradients. Along the first of these gradients is a hierarchy of classifications, with those
which are most invidious-suspect classifications based on traits such as race-at the top. Along
the second, arranged in ascending order of importance, are interests such as employment, educa-
tion, and voting. When the classification drawn lies at the top of the first gradient, it will be subject
to strict review even when the interest it affects ranks low on the second gradient-for example,
the denial of a driver's license on the basis of race. As the nature of the classification becomes less
invidious (descending on the first gradient) the measure will continue to elicit strict review only as
it affects interests progressively more important (ascending on the second gradient)." Gunther
criticizes this part of the new model, saying that it implicitly reintroduces a "value-laden appraisal
of the legitimacy of ends" into the Court's analysis. However, he considers it to be part of the
Court's as yet inchoate search for a new equal protection. Gunther, supra note 71, at 33-37.
84. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the "fundamental" right of procreation protected in Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson,8 5 and the state consequently had to demon-
strate a high degree of relationship. That is, the state had to draw rather
precise classifications. The personal interest affected was too important
for the classes to be "riddled with exceptions.""6 In other contexts, when
the affected interest is not as personal and judicial competence to evalu-
ate the classification declines, the state will have to demonstrate a lesser
degree of relationship.
B. Implementation of the Standard of Review
At least two courts have applied the standards articulated by Reed
and Eisenstadt in contexts other than college admissions testing and
determined that a standardized ability test fails the new rational rela-
tionship standard of review. The more significant decision, Armstead v.
Starkville Municipal Separate School District,87 concerned the use of a
85. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
86. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), and similar cases are
not entirely applicable to the new approach. In McDonald inmates awaiting a trial in the county
jail were denied the right to receive absentee ballots. The inmates claimed that the distinction
between those medically incapacitated, who received absentee ballots, and those judicially incapaci-
tated, who did not, denied them their fundamental right to vote. Characterizing their claim as
pertaining to the right to receive an absentee ballot rather than to the right to vote, the Court
applied traditional equal protection standards of review and upheld the state's absentee ballot plan
because over a 50-year period the state gradually had added groups to absentee coverage as they
came to its attention. The underlying theory of McDonald must rest upon the distinction between
restrictive and remedial state action. McDonald seemingly gives the states permission to create
under-inclusive classifications with respect to the imposition of a benefit, but Eisenstadt and Reed
apparently do not permit the imposition of a detriment over-inclusively. See also Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 1084-87.
87. 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972), affg 325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971); accord, Chance
v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), affg 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In
Chance, New York had required candidates for supervisory positions in New York City's public
schools not only to satisfy the state's minimum criteria for such positions, but also to pass examina-
tions administered by the city's Board of Examiners. Plaintiffs, a black and a Puerto Rican, had
met the state's requirements but were unable to pass the Board's examination for assistant princi-
pals. The district court found that the tests had a discriminatory effect, purportedly applied the
compelling interest standard, and subsequently enjoined the tests' use when the Board could not
show that its tests were job related. The court of appeals agreed with the district court's findings
of fact, but reasoned that the more lenient standards of Reed and Eisenstadt should apply. Never-
theless, it determined that the Board had failed to meet its burden of justification. The chief
significance of the decision lies in the findings of the district court, which rejected the affidavits of
noted authorities supporting the Board's test. See also Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 736 n.14
(Ist Cir. 1972), rev'g 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971) (refused to apply the Chance analysis to
facts substantially similar to those in Armstead and Chance); Note, Validity of Standardized
Employment Testing Under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, 37 Mo. L. REv. 693 (1972).
But see Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (employ-
ment test sufficiently job related).
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Graduate Record Examination (GRE) administered by the Educational
Testing Service and designed to determine an individual's capacity for
graduate study in education. Anticipating an order to desegregate its
school system immediately, defendant school board adopted an official
policy that had the effect of requiring a minimum GRE score for one
to retain employment with the board. When the school system consoli-
dated its segregated schools, several black teachers who were not hired
as a result of the new policy sued to enjoin its enforcement. The district
court granted relief, finding that the GRE score requirement classified
applicants on the basis of race, a suspect classification. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, but found it unnecessary to decide whether
the GRE created racial classifications. Citing Eisenstadt and Reed, the
court instead found that the use made of the GRE scores bore no
rational relationship to the purpose for which the GRE was designed.88
Since the examination was designed to measure capacity for graduate
study and was not validated for measuring a teacher's effectiveness, the
court reasoned that there was no rational relationship between a GRE
test score and a teacher's ability. Like the Supreme Court in Reed and
Eisenstadt, the court declined to indulge in judicial speculation and
required the school district to justify its procedures by affirmative
proof.8
9
A standardized ability test not designed to measure the abilities
that its users claim to be testing indeed lacks the "fair and substantial
relation" to the purpose of classification required by Reed and
Eisenstadt. Armstead, however, did not concern inadequacies of the
GRE itself; the test presumably can measure an individual's readiness
for graduate study with a predictable degree of accuracy. It was the use
to which the test was put-measuring a teacher's effectiveness-that
lacked a fair and substantial relation to a GRE test score. Although a
standardized ability test in fact may not measure innate ability, but only
the extent to which a student has been deprived of a good education by
88. 461 F.2d at 279.
89. The district court also had enjoined a portion of the school board policy that released
teachers possessing a masters degree or an AA Teaching Certificate, which itself requires a masters
degree, from the GRE minimum score requirement. 325 F. Supp. at 565. The circuit court reversed
this part of the district court's decree, saying that the evidence did not support the court's findings
that the requirement would have racial implications. 461 F.2d at 280. Judge Rives dissented to
this part of the circuit court's opinion. 461 F.2d at 281. He noted that the obvious place for
Starkville teachers to seek a masters degree was Mississippi State University, which is also located
in Starkville. That university, however, has a minimum GRE score requirement for graduate study
that is higher than the one set by the school district for retaining a position in the school system.
Consequently, Judge Rives concluded that the masters degree alternative was illusory, serving only
to implement the invalid GRE score requirement used by the school district. 461 F.2d at 282.
[Vol. 26
1973] STANDARDIZED ABILITY TESTS IN EDUCATION 811
environmental factors, a test relying on present ability to read and other
developmental skills may bear a "fair and substantial" relation to an
individual's readiness for, as opposed to his ability to do, college level
work. 0
That argument, however, overlooks what may be the essence of an
irrational classification. In cases that involve state-created classifica-
tions hinging on "suspect" criteria or burdening a "fundamental" inter-
est, the plaintiff ordinarily does not argue that he has been included in
the wrong class; rather, he argues that the ends for which the class was
created are constitutionally impermissible." On the other hand, when a
plaintiff argues that a method of classification is not rationally related
to its purpose, he quarrels not with the state's method of classification
but with its precision. He says: "The means that you have used to
classify me are legitimate, but they are so imprecise that one cannot
possibly tell whether you have classified me correctly." Similarly, a
plaintiff challenging his classification by means of a standardized ability
test score says: "Testing may be a legitimate means of classification, but
this test is so inadequate that one cannot possibly tell whether I am
ready for or have the ability to do college level work." Practical experi-
ence seems to support such a contention. Some colleges have discovered
that minority group applicants for admission can perform as well as
middle-class applicants who have achieved significantly higher scores.1
2
Moreover, the individual who claims, for example, that he has been
penalized by an examination's ambiguous questions does not maintain
that his lower score is the result of a poor education. He maintains that
his score resulted from imprecision inherent to the test. His claim is that
there is no fair and substantial relation between his ability and his test
score." Measured against an individual's strong personal interest in
education, the use of standardized ability test scores as an admission
criterion may be difficult to justify: first, they purport to measure abil-
ity, which in fact may be impossible to assess directly, so that the
analysis used in Armstead would apply; secondly, although they have a
90. Cf. Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School Board, 81
HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1520 (1968).
91. Cf Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 1077-78.
92. See Note, supra note 2, at 741. Apparently, one missing critical factor is the tests'
inability to assess an individual's motivation. See id; text accompanying note 21 supra.
93. In such an argument, an essential element of the plaintiff's case is a showing of misclassi-
fication. See Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972) (lack of proof that civil service
test caused disproportionate impact on employment of blacks). Plaintiffs in Armstead also included
as an element of their proof a showing that some capable teachers, as measured by other standards,
were not hired due to the school board's GRE requirement. See 325 F. Supp. at 568.
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degree of predictable accuracy in measuring readiness for college work,
they may be so imprecise that the Eisenstadt rationale would invalidate
their use in any case. 4
V. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
The fourteenth amendment prohibits any state from denying a per-
son liberty or property without "due process" of law. Due process anal-
ysis deals with two basic questions: first, whether the concepts of "lib-
erty" or "property" encompass an asserted interest so that the proce-
dural requirements of due process apply; and secondly, if due process
does apply, what formal procedures due process requires to protect the
interest adequately. At least since the Supreme Court's decision in
Board of Regents v. Roth,95 the concept of property does not include a
94. Two other courts purportedly have applied the compelling interest standard to invalidate
the use of standardized ability tests within a school system. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401
(D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), confronted Judge
Skelly Wright with the problem of remedying Washington, D.C.'s de facto segregated school
system. The city's schools had adopted a track system designed to assign students of the same
general ability to one of 4 tracks, each offering a curriculum of different difficulty. Standardized
ability tests were the primary determinant of track assignments. Although the track system was
designed to permit each student to work at his optimum level, the system worked rigidly in practice,
and students placed in a low track at an early age often had little chance to redeem themselves
afterwards. After making exhaustive findings, Judge Wright found that track placement hinged
not on ability but rather upon "socio-economic or racial status, or-more precisely-according to
environmental and psychological factors which have nothing to do with innate ability." 269 F.
Supp. at 514. Subscribing to a special judicial concern for disadvantaged minorities, he placed a
"weighty burden" on the school system to explain why the poor and blacks populated "the lower
ranks of the track system." Id. at 513. His conclusion, however, was that the inadequacies of
standardized ability tests violated the underlying premise of the track system and destroyed its
rationality. Id. at 514. According to his conclusion, Judge Wright's invocation of the compelling
interest standard was unnecessary. The traditional standard of review might have sufficed instead.
See also Note, supra note 90, at 1519.
P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), involved the use of standardized ability tests
used to place students in classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR). Black students from
the EMR classes, who had scored above the cutoff point for assignment to EMR classes when
tested by black psychologists attempting to overcome test bias, sued to enjoin the use of the tests.
Racial imbalance in the classes was admitted. The court, therefore, relied on Hobson and required
plaintiffs only to show that the tests were the primary determinant of placement in EMR classes
before placing a burden on defendants to demonstrate a "rational connection" between the tests
and their ultimate use. Although a state statute required a complete psychological examination,
parental consent, and school achievement that substantiated ability test scores, plaintiffs met their
burden by arguing that test scores were the objective handle that the school system used to justify
placement. Defendant's justifications, which centered on an argument that the test had no reasona-
ble alternatives, were equally unsuccessful. See also Western Addition Community Organization
v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal.
1970); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1960).
95. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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"unilateral expectation" of a benefit. Thus, although the traditional
distinction between rights, which were afforded due process protection,
and privileges, which were not, has been discredited thoroughly," an
individual still must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to a bene-
fit before it will be characterized as a property interest to which the
procedural safeguards of due process apply." A college education is not
yet a benefit for which someone can assert a claim of entitlement, 8 and
claiming that an adverse ability test score has deprived one of a property
right likely would encounter little favorable judicial response.
The concept of liberty, on the other hand, has been defined broadly
to include the opportunity to choose one's employment" and to defend
one's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.'"' In Wisconsin v.
Constantineau,10 for example, a state statute provided that certain per-
sons could forbid the sale of liquors for one year to one who displayed
described conditions or exhibited specified traits as the result of exces-
sive drinking. To trigger the statute, such persons needed only to sign a
statement and post a notice in retail liquor establishments. There was
no requirement of notice or hearing prior to the posting. Plaintiff, whose
name had been posted by her local police chief without notice or hear-
ing, sued for injunctive relief. Holding that the statute violated proce-
dural due process, a federal district court granted relief, and the Su-
preme Court affirmed. Pointing out that posting imposed a "stigma"
upon an individual, the Court held that the due process safeguards of
notice and an opportunity to be heard apply whenever a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity are at stake. 02 Although a stand-
ardized ability test does not impose any stigma upon an individual in
the sense that he is exposed to public embarrassment because of a low
test score, it does impair his scholastic reputation. Moreover, insofar as
96. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971): "[T]his Court now has rejected
the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized
as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
97. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
98. Of course, once the benefit is conferred, one must be afforded procedural due process
before it can be revoked, provided state action is found. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp.
609 (D.D.C. 1967), remanded, 412 F.2d 1128 (1969).
99. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915).
100. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
101. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
102. See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961); Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1946).
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an individual must reveal his score to colleges requiring an examination
score as a prerequisite to admission, he is embarrassed to the same
extent as the plaintiff in Constantineau was when she sought to purchase
liquor, or as an ex-convict is when he seeks employment.
Standardized ability tests also may affect an individual's opportun-
ity to choose his own employment. For example, in Willner v. Commit-
tee on Character and Fitness,0 3 petitioner had passed his state bar
examinations but repeatedly had failed to receive a favorable endorse-
ment from the Committee, which was charged by the state courts with
investigating the character and fitness of applicants. The Committee,
however, had refused steadfastly either to furnish reasons for its refusal
or a hearing at which petitioner could confront anyone opposing his
admission. Reversing a state court affirmance of the Committee's deci-
sion, the Supreme Court held that procedural due process safeguards
apply to the decision to deny an individual his right to practice law. In
Willner, the Committee argued that it acted merely in an advisory
capacity and made no quasi-judicial determination of an applicant's
fitness. The Court, however, noted that a favorable endorsement from
the Committee was a virtual prerequisite for admission; consequently,
it concluded that the Committee's role was quasi-judicial and that peti-
tioner was entitled to notice and a hearing. Standardized ability tests
often make a similar kind of determination about an individual's capa-
bilities for college study. Because an ability test score is a prerequisite
for admission, the testing agency does not merely advise the college; it
makes a conclusive determination about an individual's capability. Abil-
ity test scores also are required for professional study, and a college
degree is a prerequisite for some kinds of employment. Because an
adverse test score could impair employment opportunity substantially,
the safeguards of procedural due process could apply in some fashion
to the testing process.
VI. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
A. Due Process
Once it is determined that the procedural safeguards of due process
apply to protect an interest, the second step of the analytical process is
to determine the form that the safeguards will take. That analysis in-
103. 373 U.S. 96 (1963). See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 38 (1915).
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volves a balancing process and concerns whether the individual's interest
in avoiding a restriction upon his protected interest outweighs the gov-
ernment's interest in a summary determination."4 In some cases, when
providing due process safeguards would threaten the public safety, the
government may take summary action." 5 Even in such instances, how-
ever, it must provide due process safeguards afterwards. The individual,
of course, has a strong personal interest in knowing that his standard-
ized ability test score is an accurate assessment of his capabilities. The
immediate prospect of a college education, future employment pros-
pects, and large sums of money may hinge upon its accuracy. The
testing agency, on the other hand, does not have an overriding interest
in a summary determination of an individual's ability. Indeed, it would
be to the agency's advantage to discover inaccuracies or faults within
its examinations.
The primary disadvantage to the imposition of due process require-
ments upon the testing agency, of course, would be the huge administra-
tive costs associated with administering a formal system of quasi-
judicial procedures; however, the elements of due process necessary to
protect against abuse may not require formalized procedures. More-
over, adequate safeguards could be developed to ensure that individuals
do not disseminate the contents of an ability test to the public. Providing
the student access to a copy of the examination would ensure against
incorrect or ambiguous questions. Permitting the student to attach addi-
tional information to his score would cause college admission officials
to acknowledge the student's objection to the accuracy of his score, and
supplying the student either with access to his admissions file or with
reasons for a denial of admission would enable him to determine
whether a faulty standardized ability test was a key factor in his denial.
Armed with the information gained thereby, he perhaps could challenge
the examination as a violation of equal protection. 8 In any case, he
would have the opportunity to discover whether the test was an accurate
measure of his ability.
Congress enacted the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)I0 7
in response to the same concerns over the subjects of credit reports,
about whom specialized credit reporting bureaus supply information to
104. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
105. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964); R.A. Holman
& Co. v. SEC, 229 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
106. See note 61 supra.
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970).
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potential creditors. Providing safeguards similar to FCRA would per-
mit persons aggrieved by a standardized ability test to gain the toe-hold
necessary for accomplishing internal rather than judicial resolution of
their problem.
Section 609 of the FCRA requires credit bureaus to disclose upon
demand the nature, substance, and sources of the information contained
in their files.108 A similar requirement, imposed on test score users rather
than on suppliers, would enable a student to determine the effect of his
test score upon a denial of admission. When imposed on the supplier, it
perhaps would enable the student to obtain access to a copy of his
examination and the correct answers thereto. In either case, the likeli-
hood of achieving a more accurate measure of an individual's ability
would increase.
Section 611 of the Act requires a credit bureau to investigate the
completeness or accuracy of any item in its report unless it has reasona-
ble grounds to believe the subject's dispute is irrelevant or frivolous;
however, that the bureau's information contradicts the subject's claim
is not a reason for believing the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant., 9 If
the bureau and the subject are unable to resolve their dispute, the bureau
must record that fact in the subject's file.110 Applying these requirements
to standardized ability tests would enable an individual to challenge
parts of his examination and require the testing agency to investigate
the accuracy of his complaint. Moreover, that the agency disagrees with
the student would be an insufficient ground either for refusing to investi-
gate the complaint or for eventually recording its existence."1
108. 15 U.S.C. § 168lg (1970). At least one commentator finds that section wholly inade-
quate because it does not require the credit bureau to permit the subject actually to read his report.
See Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1064 (1971). Presumably,
that inadequcy could be remedied for standardized ability tests.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1970). Leaving the credit bureau the right to determine, with one
exception, what is irrelevant or frivolous could leave the subject without adequate protection. See
Note, supra note 108, at 1066. Virtually all objections to a standardized ability test, however,
presumably would fall within the exception.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1970).
111. The FCRA was enacted at least partly because of the failure of 2 common-law doc-
trines-libel and products liability-to remedy the abuses of credit bureaus adequately. Although
libel ordinarily does not require proof of specific economic damages, when extrinsic facts are
required in order to make out the defamatory meaning, such libel "per quod" requires proof of
damages. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 112 (1971). Consequently, for most potential plaintiffs the
burden of proving economic damage would be an insurmountable barrier despite the incorrectness
of a test score. Moreover, the ability to prove special damages would not necessarily be conclusive
of liability. A testing agency still would have the affirmative defense of a conditional privilege. In
situations in which conditional privileges apply, the defendant is not granted absolute immunity
for his publication; rather, it is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a
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B. Equal Protection
The presence of procedural safeguards cannot, however, ensure
that admissions testing systems will meet the requirements of the equal
protection clause. Nevertheless, given the absence of adequate alterna-
tives or standards for standardized ability tests, their blanket invalida-
tion on equal protection grounds could lead to either of two conse-
quences, each equally undesirable: educators, without the seemingly
objective criteria of ability test scores, might adopt more subtle and
frustrating criteria having greater potential for discrimination and hold-
ing even less relevance to college performance than ability test scores;
or courts might respond by setting admission standards themselves.
Standards that will diminish substantially the likelihood of potential
harm from, and at the same time permit the continued use of, standard-
ized ability tests therefore are indicated. The standards proposed in the
remainder of this section hopefully would achieve those goals.
1. Federal Employment Test Standards.-Section 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964112 permits employers to use profes-
sionally developed ability tests to determine qualifications for employ-
ment or advancement.1 13 Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Fed-
eral Contract Compliance (OFCC) have established guidelines for test-
ing and selecting employees." 4 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"' the
reasonable purpose. Conditional privileges often are recognized in cases in which the publisher and
the recipient have a common interest and the publication is designed to protect or further it, as in
the case of the legal contractual obligation of the testing agency to report a student's score. See
id. at § 115(3). Most courts, by invoking either a theory of tort or of implied warranty, recognize
strict liability for the maker or supplier of a product. See id. at §§ 97-98. Sellers of services,
however, are generally liable only for negligence. Id. at § 104. Therefore, the liability of a testing
agency would hinge on whether it is supplying a product or a service; and although arguments to
the contrary can, of course, be conceived, it is extremely doubtful that a court would find that a
testing agency is supplying a product. See also Note, supra note 108, at 1049-61.
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h)(1970).
113. "See. 703. (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 78 Stat.
255, 255-57 codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
114. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1972); 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-3.1 to 60-3.18 (1972).
115. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Supreme Court interpreted section 703 to permit the use of ability tests
only if such tests are job related."' The tests examined by the Court in
Griggs had no demonstrable relationship with job performance and were
simply tests of general ability on which blacks achieved dispropor-
tionately lower scores than whites. After concluding that the congres-
sional intent behind section 703 was to require job-related tests, the
Court endorsed the EEOC guidelines for testing and selecting employ-
ees, which it said were developed to ensure only the use of job-related
tests. Although the Court did not apply constitutional standards to the
tests used in Griggs, any conceptual difference between requiring a "fair
and substantial" relationship between test scores and job performance
and requiring that test scores be "job-related" appears negligible. In-
deed, the EEOC standards endorsed by the Court in Griggs may repre-
sent its conception of a fair and substantial relationship.1
7
The guidelines developed by the EEOC and OFCC, although strict,
are not complex. They basically require each employer to have evidence
available to demonstrate that he is not using his tests in a discriminatory
manner. To overcome this burden, the employer must be able to show
both that his tests are valid and that they evidence a high degree of
utility." 8 To apprise the employer of the standards that his tests must
meet, the regulations prescribe guideline standards for validation and
utility."' Minimal validation includes the use of generally accepted psy-
chological procedures, the use of representative samples, and adminis-
tration and scoring under controlled and standardized conditions-all
standards that college entrance examinations should satisfy. Other mini-
mal standards prescribed by the regulations, however, presently may be
unattainable for some entrance exams.
One factor that the regulations use to assess utility is the number
of applicants who eventually will be hired or admitted.' Frequently,
when the pressure of applications is strong, employers and colleges can
raise their requirements to increase the likelihood that all persons ad-
116. 401 U.S. at 436.
117. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 63 (1972) ("Griggs redefines discrimination
in terms of consequence rather than motive, effect rather than purpose."). But see United States
v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
118. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1972). For thorough discussions of employment test-
ing see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Ap-
proach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1958 (1969);
Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113-40 (1971).
119. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.3 (1972).
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(2)(i) (1972).
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mitted will be qualified. Conversely, when the labor or student market
is tight, standards are lower, and a stronger relationship between ability
and test performance is needed. If, for example, twenty applicants are
available for every position, the score required for admission will be so
comparatively high that a coefficient of correlation near .30 will predict
correctly 75 percent of the applicants' later performances; however, if
there are only five applicants for every position, the necessarily more
closely grouped scores mean that the coefficient must exceed .45 to
achieve the same predictive accuracy.' College entrance examinations,
which have coefficients of approximately .5, consequently would be on
the borderline under federal standards. Highly selective colleges having
a large number of applicants could continue to utilize such examina-
tions, but less selective institutions, which probably admit more than
one of every five applicants, might find the use of such examinations
foreclosed.
22
For the question whether the EEOC guidelines should apply to
college entrance examinations, the answer lies in the anomalous position
121. W. BYHAM & M. SPITZER, THE LAW AND PERSONNEL TESTING 125-26 (1971). On the
following scatter plot each dot repre- JOB PERFORMANCE
sents one person's test score. A test
score of 50 is designed to indicate the 4 1
minimum level needed for school or job _.
performance. If only the applicants in -
quadrant I are selected, all of the indi- .
viduals would succeed on the job or in 3 2
school. The test, however, would select .:
all these persons in quadrants I and 2.
Those in quadrant 2 should not be se- _ /
lected. More importantly, those in quad- -TEST SCORE
rant 4 should be selected, but their test 50 75
score will be unacceptable. Only for reject select
those persons in quadrants I and 3 will
the decision be correct. If there are a great number of applicants, the test user can adopt a
minimum score of 75 and insure that he gets only qualified persons; however, as the number of
applicants decreases, he cannot be so selective. Moreover, to eliminate the element of chance, the
test must have a distribution of scores that is much more elongated. For a detailed discussion of
validation see id. at 105-46.
122. Despite validation and evidence of utility, the presence of disproportionately lower
scores for minorities may be sufficient in and of itself to find a test discriminatory under Title VIII.
Cf. EEOC Decision No. 71-1418, CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE, 1 1451.10 (March 17,
1971). The regulations themselves, however, seemingly provide a negative response to the question.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1972). Another federal standard provides that the relationship between
test performance and at least one criterion of job performance must be so statistically significant
that only one of every 20 sufficiently high scores occurs by chance. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(1)
(1972). That standard is, however, unattainable for any known ability test, and in the absence of
realistic federal standards the courts have turned to the Supreme Court's language in Griggs. See
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that college entrance examinations would occupy if uniform require-
ments were not used."' With respect to employment tests, an employer
must carry the burden of proof to show the value of his examinations.
If an educational institution can wait for a minority plaintiff to prove
its tests unreasonable, or if the institution's burden is less rigorous,
factors other than ability might continue to determine eligibility for
college education while we are removing the last vestiges of discrimina-
tion in other areas of our culture.
2. Differential Validation.-The test maker should not necessar-
ily abandon an examination simply because minority groups achieve
disproportionately lower scores. Disproportionately low scores may
mean only that a different cutoff score is appropriate for that group.
That is, a minority group applicant may have the same capabilities as
another applicant, but because of inequities built into the exam, his
score is lower. Consequently, the test predicts with the same degree of
accuracy for minority groups, but only by using different scores as
cutoff points. This phenomenon is known as differential validity., 4 If
the institution does not apply different standards and combines the
results of all groups, it will accept fewer minority applicants although
they have probabilities of success equal to other applicants.
Using lower cutoff scores for minority applicants raises the ques-
tion whether such a practice is an impermissible racial classification.
12
Several decisions, however, hold that the provision of equal educational
opportunity is so compelling that remedial racial classifications are
permissible,28 and the courts generally have allowed school boards to
eradicate voluntarily the effects of segregation on education.127 Using
lower cutoff scores for the culturally deprived therefore should be a
constitutionally valid means to overcome the disadvantages imposed on
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES DEc. 7073, 7092 (N.D. Ga.
1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
123. Cf. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972).
124. For a thorough discussion of the concept see W. BYHAM & M. SPITZER, supra note 121,
at 128-45; Note, supra note 2, at 700-06; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1972). Of course, the
test also may be valid for one group but not for another. The obvious solution in such a situation
is to use 2 different tests.
125. See O'Neil, supra note 61, at 705-18.
126. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920,931-32 (2d Cir.
1968); United States v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 395 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 900 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967); Wanner v. School Bd., 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. Plaquemines Parish
School Bd., 291 F. Supp. 841, 846 (E.D. La. 1967).
127. O'Neil, supra note 61, at 715.
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some individuals by college entrance examinations." 8
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite their unquestioned importance, the use of standardized
ability tests in education heretofore has been largely unsupervised. Al-
though such tests may be an improvement over subjective forms of
evaluation, an individual deprived of further education by a faulty test
probably finds little solace in that knowledge. Recent judicial develop-
ments suggest that the makers of standardized ability tests soon may
have to prove their products worthy of the reliance placed upon them;
yet the current inadequacies of their products may fail to withstand
scrutiny. Standardized ability tests are in all likelihood here to stay.
Required will be judicially manageable standards that the test makers
themselves can meet. Coupled with procedural safeguards, such stan-
dards will enhance the probability of finally meeting Horace Mann's
expectations for standardized tests.
LEWIS D. BECKWITH*
128. Some commentators believe that differential validity may be an illusory phenomenon.
See Ruch & Ash, Comments on Psychological Testing, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 608, 611 (1969). Others
are not so dubious. See W. BYHAM & M. SPITZER, supra note 121, at 128-45. Some of the
objections to differential validity dispute not its reality, but the added costs of validation and test
administration. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 1129. For tests administered on such a large scale as college entrance
examinations, the latter objections have little substance.
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